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Abstract: Rewards for environmental services (RES) link global priorities 
on poverty reduction and environmental sustainability and are designed to 
balance effectiveness and efficiency with fairness and pro-poor characteristics. 
Yet, emerging RES approaches tend to focus primarily on the efficiency in 
provisioning the environmental services and often neglect the perspectives 
of various actors involved in natural resource management, their livelihood 
strategies and the multi-dimensional nature of poverty. This paper assesses 
some key issues associated with the design and implementation of RES in 
various Asian pilot sites by developing and exploring two propositions related 
to conditions required for RES to effectively contribute to poverty alleviation, 
and to preferred forms of pro-poor mechanisms. Our first proposition is that 
only under specific circumstances will actual cash incentives to individual 
RES participants contribute substantially to poverty alleviation in ES provider 
communities. The second proposition is that non-financial incentives to ES 
providers will contribute to reducing poverty by linking the community 
(participants and non-participants) to access to various types of capital (human, 
social, natural, physical and financial). A review of key ratios of relative 
numbers and wealth of service providers and beneficiaries supports the first 
proposition and rejects the notion of widespread potential for reducing upstream 
rural poverty through individual cash payments. Results of community focus 
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group discussions support the second proposition through context-specific 
preferences for mechanisms by which RES can help trigger conditions for 
sustainable development.
Keywords: Asia, conservation, financial payment, non-financial payment, 
payments for environmental services, pro-poor, poverty
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1. Introduction
The basic rationale for payments for environmental services (PES) is that 
without benefit transfers that are conditional on environmental service1 delivery, 
decisions on local resource use tend to overexploit resources and ignore effects 
on external stakeholders. Given sufficient scope of independent decision making 
by people whose actions influence environmental services (ES), incentives from 
those who receive the services can be effective to ensure continuity of ES. While 
beneficiaries of ES would generally like to receive these services free of charge, 
the legitimacy of resource use by others may have to be accepted and PES may 
be a viable option if it can lead to actual protection and restoration of natural 
resources and ES. For upstream ES providers, payments must be sufficient to 
exceed costs for opportunities voluntarily foregone in order for net benefits to 
emerge.
Design of PES schemes as an incentive-based approach is an alternative 
to the command-and-control approach that has usually preceded it (Ferraro 
2001; Ferraro and Kiss 2002; Wunder 2005, 2007). Yet, since payments can 
only be provided for legitimate resource management, the effective functioning 
1
 Since the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment the term ‘ecosystem service’ is commonly used, but 
this includes the ‘provisioning’ services or production of goods; we use ‘environmental services’ 
here as the equivalent of ‘regulating, ‘supporting and ‘cultural’ ecosystem services, as derived from 
natural or agro-ecosystems (MEA 2005).
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of PES mechanisms requires redefinition rather than abolishment of rules and 
their enforcement. PES refers to a wide range of potential incentives made to 
ES providers, ranging from one-off direct payments by ES beneficiaries to ES 
providers to more complex ‘market’ mechanisms involving offset credits traded 
among many buyers and sellers (Scherr et al. 2006; Smith et al. 2006). Four 
types of PES schemes can be distinguished and differentiated by the degree of 
government intervention in administration of the schemes, by the characteristics 
of the buyers and sellers, and by the source of payments: (1) private payment 
schemes; (2) cap-and-trade schemes, under a regulatory cap or floor; (3) 
certification schemes for environmental goods; (4) public payment schemes, 
including fiscal mechanisms. 
In developing PES schemes, economic incentives are seen as the core 
consideration and conservation is targeted more directly than when it is integrated 
into broader development approaches (Wunder 2005). Realistic schemes need 
to be based on clear and recognizable cause-effect pathways involved in the 
production of ES. Proxies representing these pathways can be accepted as a basis 
for conditionality only in so far as these proxies are themselves subject to regular 
evaluation and refinement.
Neglect of the perspectives of all actors in the landscape and their 
livelihood strategies can jeopardize the success of PES schemes, such as when 
programmes are disrupted by communities who do not benefit from a PES. 
Furthermore, under global imperatives such as the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG), concerted action will be required by all sectors 
of society to achieve MDG targets such as halving the number of people living 
in absolute poverty by the year 2015. Balance at the nexus of conservation and 
poverty alleviation is needed to achieve these dual goals. But how to combine 
PES with broader development approaches remains a major challenge in 
Asia. 
PES mechanisms need to balance effectiveness and efficiency with fairness 
and pro-poor characteristics, with transaction costs as obstacles to both. 
Advocates of effectiveness and efficiency tend to see transactions in economic 
terms and generally prefer the term ‘payments’. Proponents of fairness and equity 
dimensions as elements that need to be added to effectiveness and efficiency 
prefer the broader concept of ‘rewards’2. Van Noordwijk et al. (2007) developed 
a set of principles and criteria3 for rewards for environmental services (RES) 
that are summarized in four attributes (realistic, conditional, voluntary and 
pro-poor).
2
 In this paper, we consistently use ‘rewards for environmental services (RES)’ for our concepts and 
findings and ‘payment for environmental services (PES)’ for other special cases focused on financial 
transactions. 
3
 Indicators of such criteria are available in draft version. 
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(a) Realistic: A RES should be able to reduce and avoid threats to environmental 
services that are likely to happen in the absence of further intervention; to 
do so, benefits gained by both sellers and buyers need to be tangible and 
sustainable. For ES intermediaries, there must be sufficient values accruing 
from ES to support development of RES mechanisms.
(b) Conditional: A RES should be able to connect actual ES provision with the 
reward being provided, in a manner that ensures transparency regarding 
conditions when rewards can be granted or not.
(c) Voluntary: A RES is voluntary when engagement of ES providers in RES 
schemes is based on free choice rather than on being the object of regulation. 
The key distinction between RES and purely regulatory solutions to ES 
issues is that both buyers and sellers voluntarily agree on RES contractual 
agreements. Bargaining power of both buyers and sellers can increase with 
insights into each other’s strategies.
(d) Pro-poor: A RES considers equitable impacts on all actors, and design of RES 
mechanisms is positively biased towards poor stakeholders.
In this paper, we assess some key issues associated with design and implementation 
of RES by developing and exploring two propositions related to conditions 
required for RES to effectively contribute to poverty alleviation, and to preferred 
forms of pro-poor mechanisms. These propositions are explored through analysis 
and empirical findings from a set of case study sites in Asia where RES projects 
are being implemented.
2. Key issues for rewards for environmental services
The pro-poor nature of a RES scheme can be interpreted from either a design or 
a poverty impact perspective. RES strategies can be deliberately designed to be 
biased in favour of the poor when considering tradeoffs between the efficiency 
and fairness of the mechanisms employed (Gouyon 2003; Van Noordwijk 
et al. 2007). From a poverty impact perspective, a RES can be assessed by its 
contribution to poverty reduction through payments that actually reach poor 
land users or poor ES providers. A RES could, for example, target support for 
small and medium sized farmers and land owners, and even give them additional 
portions of benefits such as income from RES (Hope et al. 2005; Van Noordwijk 
et al. 2007). 
2.1. Stages in developing RES and their constraints
Literature on PES is already rich with discussions on a broad range of issues and 
constraints in establishing pro-poor PES, mostly in the context of Latin America 
(Grieg-Gran et al. 2005; Pagiola et al. 2005; Robertson and Wunder 2005), with 
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some in Asia (Tomich et al. 2004; Huang and Upadhyaya 2007) and only a few 
thus far in Africa (Ferraro 2007). Our summary of these constraints is framed by 
four stages of RES development, recognizing that high transaction costs can be an 
important constraint in all stages:
(a)	Scoping. This stage clarifies linkages between land management by ES 
providers and the ES that are actually provided. ES intermediaries and 
buyers target specific areas considered to be environmental service hot-spots. 
This spatial specificity may not coincide with areas where the poor live 
(Grieg-Gran et al. 2005; Van Noordwijk et al. 2007), and the poor may be 
excluded from such schemes because they may not qualify as ES providers. 
Even when the poor are legitimate ES providers, they usually own limited 
land. Most ES services (and payments) are based on particular land use 
at a given spatial scale. As small land-holders, the poorer members of a 
community will receive smaller proportions of benefits from PES than their 
better-off neighbours with larger land holdings. Moreover, PES programmes 
require long-term investment in order to achieve significant environmental 
impacts, so where land tenure is insecure, it may be difficult to attain these 
types of investments (Pagiola et al. 2005). 
(b)	 Stakeholder	analysis	of	RES	key	actors. Problems at this stage appear similar to 
those in the first stage, especially regarding inclusion versus exclusion of the poor 
as ES providers. 
(c)	 Negotiation	between	ES	sellers	and	buyers. Insecure land tenure can become a 
constraint for ES sellers in negotiating with buyers. It can undermine the legal 
legitimacy of sellers and limit their access to financial services needed to conduct 
activities required by the contractual agreement. And since poor people usually 
have less power in negotiation, there are risks that their voices will be neglected 
or undermined during contract formulation.
(d)	Implementation	 problems	 in	 reaching	 the	 poor. Four types of negative 
outcomes may be associated with RES implementation. Firstly, PES may 
provide incentive for powerful groups to take control of currently marginal 
lands (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; Grieg-Gran et al. 2005; Pagiola et al. 
2005). Secondly, livelihoods of the landless may be negatively affected if 
PES conditions limit their access to forested land (Kerr 2002), especially 
where the landless are women or herders whose livelihoods depend on 
gathering non-timber forest products, but who do not participate in PES 
programmes. Thirdly, farm labourers may lose their jobs when land use 
practices promoted by PES have much lower labour intensity (Pagiola et 
al. 2005). Fourthly, since most PES are area-based, there is an obvious risk 
the local distribution of rewards may further enhance existing disparity in 
wealth.
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2.2. Cash incentives and non-financial incentives of RES
The RES argument is built on local provision of environmental services that 
benefit external stakeholders, but which depend on deliberate human action. 
Environmental services to be delivered are often supplied at suboptimal levels 
due to competing opportunities to produce marketable goods and/or participate 
in paid service or industrial (urban) jobs. RES as a source of income that is 
in a form equivalent to the benefits derived from marketed goods may shift 
decision making along the goods versus services trade-off curve for local 
agroecosystems. This argument may seem to favour financial forms of freely 
disposable rewards, unless another form of rewards more effectively provides 
welfare at a collective action level that an individual would not be able to buy 
with cash in hand.
In order to have a significant effect, rewards must be sufficient relative to 
income and at least commensurate with costs of opportunities that must be 
forgone. Only then can RES seriously influence decisions about land use and their 
impacts on local natural capital and provision of environmental services. This 
criterion may be easier to meet when poverty levels are high. 
Cash payments are frequently viewed as having the highest degree of flexibility 
because they can be converted to local goods and services as prioritized by the 
receiver. Any other form of reward can be seen as indirect and ‘patronizing’. 
Notwithstanding these valid arguments, in practice, it is often clear that cash 
payments are much smaller than opportunity costs for people to fully provision 
an environmental service (Grieg-Gran et al. 2005; Huang and Upadhyaya 2007; 
Leimona et al. 2007). In most cases, the quantum of payment, often about US$1 
per capita per year, is too small to be very meaningful for receiving households. 
Thus, we have seen that communities often prefer that cash available for payments 
be used for village or community funds for social and local development activities. 
For example, in Cidanau, Indonesia, farmer groups have mobilized themselves to 
use their payments in ways that can benefit all community members, including 
protecting and enhancing local water supplies, including investment in water 
pipes, and building a mosque (Munawir and Vermeulen 2007). In Latin America, 
communities in a PES initiative for watershed protection in Santa Rosa and Los 
Negros in Bolivia agreed on an annual payment of one artificial beehive for every 
10 ha of forest protected for a year (Asquith et al. 2008). This has a cash equivalent 
of about US$3/ha/year, plus the value of accompanying apicultural training. 
4
 We define cash incentives of RES as direct financial payments from ES buyers to ES providers 
(participants of RES) either to improve their land use practices or to increase ES provisions. Non-
financial incentives of RES are non-cash benefits gained by ES providers because of their engage-
ment in the scheme, such as capacity building provided by intermediaries for participants of RES, 
collective benefits (such as infrastructure), access to microcredit, or various types of recognition 
from government, which in aggregate can contribute to broader development efforts and include 
non-participants of RES. 
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Other alternatives discussed, including road improvement and marketplace or 
bridge construction, were more costly. They assumed the mediating NGO would 
be able to deliver a ready-made complete ‘package’ of benefits, which appeared 
to be a rational preference because local capacities for savings, investment and 
entrepreneurship are limited. Indeed, PES recipients in Santa Rosa specifically 
rejected the option of payments in cash (Robertson and Wunder 2005; Asquith et 
al. 2008).
Preference for non-financial payments in the Latin American case is consistent 
with findings from other case studies in Asia (Huang and Upadhyaya 2007; 
Munawir and Vermeulen 2007). The most frequent reason given by rural people 
is that money is spent rapidly for conspicuous consumption and in the end leaves 
no long-run benefits for their livelihoods. However, cases from Cidanau and 
Brantas show that when access to information and facilitation is available from 
external parties such as NGOs or local government to support capacity building 
for starting new business ventures and income diversification, then cash payments 
can provide small amounts of immediately accessible start-up capital for these 
new livelihood options (Munawir and Vermeulen 2007). 
In developing RES, the service being sold to external groups may also 
benefit the sellers. Internal benefits to ES sellers may appear to weaken the 
negotiating position of sellers based on arguments such as “why should we pay 
for a conservation effort that also benefits the sellers?” But ES buyers often 
must acknowledge that their limited budget will not be sufficient to provide 
a competitive choice relative to more profitable alternative land use. Thus, 
inclusion of additional non-financial benefits received by local people for 
managing or protecting ES can actually enhance chances for a successful RES 
when budgets of buyers are limited.
Benefits of non-financial payments can be channelled to a community as a 
whole and not just to the poor providers among them. Another type of consideration 
that can often be important is the use of public funds by government or other non 
ES-buyers to invest in specific assets and infrastructure, such as schools, health 
centres, or strengthening of human capital with skills not available locally. Such 
investments may provide benefits within a timeframe that is compatible with 
expected external benefits from the environmental service. Thus, various forms of 
co-investment and mutual responsibility may be able to emerge among ES sellers, 
ES buyers and government units with compatible mandates. 
3. Methods
3.1. Propositions
Based on our review of literature, case studies and empirical experience, we 
developed two propositions related to the effectiveness of financial rewards in 
alleviating poverty:
Proposition 1: Only under specific	 circumstances, will cash incentives 
from payment for environmental services contribute substantially to increasing 
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disposable income and thus poverty alleviation of environmental service 
providers.
Proposition 2: Indirect non-financial benefits at community scale for those 
who engage in a RES scheme contribute to reducing poverty by linking the 
community (both participants and non-participants) to access to critical forms of 
capital, including human, social/political, natural, physical (e.g. infrastructure) 
and financial (e.g. microcredit).
We explored these propositions at two levels: 1) a model of the potential 
magnitude of financial payments and their relevance for upstream income 
(Proposition 1); and 2) analysis of findings from focus group discussions at six 
RES action research sites across Asia in order to capture stakeholder perceptions 
of poverty, constraints faced by ES providers, and preferred types of RES 
(Proposition 2).
3.2. A model of RES value as fraction of upstream income
Assessment of proposition 1 requires estimates of the potential total value of 
financial RES transfers relative to current income of poor ES providers. Given 
a total value, either a small group can benefit substantially or a large group 
marginally, but policy-relevant impact on rural poverty alleviation can only 
be expected if a large group can benefit at a daily income level that helps 
in meeting the $1 per person per day threshold (or its national poverty line 
equivalent).
In formulating estimates for a potential RES we use an upstream/downstream 
terminology that can be taken literally in the case of watershed services, and more 
abstractly in case of biodiversity or climate change mitigation. 
A RES scheme that is based on willingness to pay of downstream beneficiaries 
can generate a total volume of payments TPd ($ day–1):
TP = A P Id d d d d.β  (1)
where Ad  =  Area downstream (ha), Pd  =  population density downstream 
(ha–1), Id  =  per capita income downstream ($ day–1) and βd  =  fraction of 
income that is potentially available for such payments. The per capita 
benefits, expressed as fraction of the upstream income that this can generate 
upstream (RP
u
) are:
RP TP (1 T) (1 )(A I P )
u d u u u u
1= . .− − α −  (2)
where A
u
  =  Area upstream, P
u
  =  population density upstream, I
u
  =  per capita 
income upstream, T  =  fraction of downstream payments that is needed to cover 
the transaction costs and α
u
  =  fraction of what the upstream population receives 
that is offsetting the opportunity costs of alternative land uses that might generate 
90 Beria Leimona et al.
more income but provide less environmental services. By combining equations 
(1) and (2) we obtain:
RP (A  A )(I  I )(P  P ) (1 ) (1 )
u d u
1
d u
1
d u
1
d u= ⋅− − − β − α −. T  (3)
which expresses the per capita benefits in terms of a number of dimensionless ratios: 
area, population density, income, willingness to pay by downstream beneficiaries, 
transaction costs and offset-fraction. RP
u
 may have to be a ‘significant’ fraction of 
upstream income before upstream land users will take notice of the opportunity 
and respond. 
As a criterion for use in exploring proposition 1, we tentatively postulate a 
modest target of 5% of current average annual disposable income of upstream 
rural households as a meaningful contribution to poverty reduction. Analysis of 
existing data can provide the ratios of downstream/upstream population densities, 
the areas involved and the relative income levels. 
3.3. Rewards for environmental services initiatives
To assess proposition 2, we synthesize lessons from the RUPES project5, which 
seeks to develop pro-poor RES mechanisms in Asian contexts. Analyses are 
based on five years of implementation at six RUPES action sites and other 
partners’ sites in Indonesia, the Philippines and Nepal, combined with findings 
from participatory research conducted to elicit information about people’s 
perceptions and preferences related to potential payments for environmental 
services. 
The study sites (Table 1) include biodiversity-rich jungle rubber (Bungo), 
good quality sources of upstream river and spring water (Singkarak), suitable 
land and climatic conditions for coffee plantations (Sumberjaya) and for upstream 
agricultural crops such as vegetables and rice (Bakun and Kulekhani), and 
both high biodiversity and abundant water (Kalahan). All sites are forest areas 
considered to be “under threat”, where communities are allowed to harvest non-
timber forest products for their own consumption. As in upstream areas in other 
parts of Asia, average areas of household cultivable land are <2 hectares, and most 
sites are located in undulating upstream areas.
5
 The Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services that they provide (RUPES) project 
Phase I was a project coordinated by the World Agroforestry Centre (2002–2007). The goal of the 
project was to enhance the livelihoods and reduce poverty of the upland poor while supporting 
environmental conservation through rewards for ES. For further reference, see http://www.worlda-
groforestrycenter.org/sea/networks/rupes/index.asp. To enhance the livelihoods and reduce poverty 
of the upland poor while supporting environmental conservation on biodiversity protection, water-
shed management, carbon sequestration and landscape beauty at local and global levels.
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Table	1:	Action	sites	for	testing	reward	mechanisms.
Site Focus of ES Current status 
Indonesia
Bungo Jungle rubber for conservation of the 
diversity of local plant species and wildlife 
habitat
•  Testing mini hydropower as intermediate 
reward for biodiversity conservation
•  A private buyer (automotive wheel 
industry) showing interests for rubber for 
“green” vehicles 
Singkarak •  Water quality for hydropower, native 
fish conservation and ecotourism
•  Carbon sequestration for voluntary 
markets under CDM setting
•  Conservation fund from local government 
to revitalize organic coffee in the 
upstream watershed
•  Carbon market negotiated with private 
buyer (consumer goods distributor)
Sumberjaya •  Water quality for hydropower
•  Watershed rehabilitation for the District 
Forestry Service
•  Conditional tenure rewarded to farmer 
groups
•  Hydroelectric Power company (HEP) 
royalty agreements signed for River Care 
groups along the river
The Philippines
Bakun Water quality for hydropower HEP royalty agreements signed 
Kalahan Carbon sequestration under voluntary 
market
Carbon market initial agreement with 
private buyer (automotive industry)
Nepal
Kulekhani Water quality for hydropower HEP royalty agreements signed 
Bungo In Bungo, farmers are committed to preserving jungle rubber biodiversity. 
The challenge of developing mechanisms for payments for biodiversity services 
is that jungle rubber does not shelter any charismatic animal species. Rather, it 
functions by providing important corridors that allow movement of wild animals 
and dispersal of plant species. Rubber gardens in Bungo household portfolios 
consist of both small plots of intensively managed rubber and small plots of 
extensively managed jungle rubber located either near their villages or further 
away. Farmers regard jungle rubber as a second best management system, after the 
more intensive monoculture plantations they would plant if they had the resources 
to do so. Farmers agreed to maintain jungle rubber based on rewards that enhance 
the value of their intensively managed agroforestry plots, while awaiting a longer 
term RES. The bundling of biodiversity conservation and watershed functions 
from jungle rubber is also being tested by installing micro hydropower plants to 
bring electrical supply to villages.
Sumberjaya About 40 percent of this 45,000 ha watershed is protected forest. It has 
a history of conflict, including forced evictions that caused relationships between 
local people and various levels of government to deteriorate rapidly. The RUPES-
Sumberjaya project has facilitated conditional tenure agreements for community-
based forest management that provide rewards by reducing transaction costs for 
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possible win-win solutions. Under this approach the government acknowledges 
that properly managed agroforests can bring the same watershed benefits as 
natural forests. In exchange for secure land tenure, farmers promise to conserve 
existing patches of natural forest and to use good management practices. Another 
RES scheme employs a RiverCare group to respond to challenges of conditional 
reward schemes. Community members of this group learned to monitor and 
control local sources of sediment in their streams and take soil conservation 
actions. Under a financial reward scheme, the hydropower company provides 
some upfront funds and then pays additional specified amounts based on effects 
actually achieved. RUPES also tested direct payments to the community based 
on a sliding scale starting at US$250 for a sediment reduction of <10%, and up 
to US$1,000 for a sediment reduction of 30% or more. This is an example of a 
payment for watershed services directly tied to delivery of the service – in this 
case reduction of sedimentation in the river.
Singkarak Singkarak Lake is located in West Sumatra, well known for its culture 
of blending its matrilineal society with Islamic tradition, entrepreneurship, a 
strong tradition of village governance (Nagari), and collective management of 
land belonging to clans (Ulayat	Kaum) and local Nagari groups (Ulayat	Nagari). 
In 2002, National Strategy Studies on CDM conducted by the Indonesian 
Ministry of Environment identified the Singkarak watershed as a potential site for 
implementing a national reforestation-carbon project. But despite its preparedness, 
the project has no confirmed buyers of the carbon. One of the difficultness in 
identifying investors is that the project was initiated when most rules regarding 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and the carbon market in Indonesia were 
still in an embryonic stage. Beyond the carbon market, the RUPES-Singkarak 
team sought to have hydropower royalty money flow to upstream communities, 
to clarify links between land use and environmental services, and to facilitate 
emergence of appropriate institutional arrangements for managing land use. In 
2005, the Nagaris surrounding the lake received about US $40,000 under their 
first allocation of hydropower royalties. The system uses criteria that include 
compensation for damage to livelihoods in Nagaris bordering the lake, which 
favors relatively poor Nagaris. Funds are intended to provide incentives for 
maintaining healthy environmental conditions. As the amount of royalties 
available depends on the amount of electricity produced, all players have a strong 
interest in the good performance of the hydropower company.
Bakun The Philippines also has a policy of royalty payments for hydropower. 
There is a tax of about 2% on the value of power produced, some of which 
is meant to be spent locally, but rarely is. At the Bakun site there is also an 
agreement between the hydropower company and local government providing 
a royalty of another 2% of the value of the power in return for watershed 
protection. But there are no specific targets for watershed protection. The Bakun 
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Indigenous Tribes’ Organization (BITO) has attempted to negotiate additional 
payments, but has not succeeded. BITO is also negotiating with the local 
government to utilize a portion of their royalty revenue for conservation. BITO 
has been more successful in negotiating an agreement with the hydropower 
company for a new project. The company will also pay an annual amount of 
P500,000 (about US$10,000) to the barangay government where its plant is 
located. The barangay of 316 households will benefit from these payments, 
which were negotiated by BITO and facilitated by the National Council of 
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).
Kalahan The Kalahan forest reserve in Nueva Vizcaya province of the 
Philippines supports the livelihoods of approximately 550 Ikalahan families, as 
well as forests with diverse plant and animal species. Resources in the reserve, 
which covers 14,730 hectares of ancestral land, are managed by the indigenous 
Ikalahan people under an agreement with the Philippine Government. Originally 
hunters and gatherers, the Ikalahan have been swidden farmers for at least two 
centuries, coaxing the thin, acidic soils of their land to produce their traditional 
food, sweet potatoes or camote. Implemented by the Kalahan Educational 
Foundation (KEF), the RUPES project is developing contracts for carbon 
sequestration with carbon buyers. Monitoring of forest reserve carbon stocks 
is an on-going activity for avoided deforestation buyers. To date, the KEF has 
conducted preliminary activities to prepare for these markets, especially through 
project idea notes and awareness building among members of the indigenous 
group.
Kulekhani In Nepal, the Kulekhani watershed is located in Makwanpur district 
of the Central Development Region of Nepal, 50 km southwest of Kathmandu. 
The watershed supplies water to two major hydropower plants that generate 
about 17 percent of Nepal’s current total hydroelectricity. The state hydroelectric 
company by law pays royalty to the central government, who then channels 
part of the royalty back to districts. Thus, the hydropower company, the central 
and district governments all benefit from the hydrology services that Kulekhani 
conservation activities provide, making all three potential buyers. Existing 
policy is for generators to pay a 6% royalty on the value of hydro-electric power 
they produce. The distribution of the payment is 88% for the central government 
and 12% for the district. After formal assessment of the current socio-political 
scenario and existing laws and regulations in Nepal, an alternative mechanism 
of reward transfer was proposed wherein the district government sets aside a 
portion of its hydropower royalty from the central government for the upland 
communities. A newly established group with representatives of Kulekhani 
communities proposed conservation programmes as their contract commitment 
to the royalty share. The project has been successful in securing an agreement 
that 20% of the royalty paid to the district will be given to the local village 
administration (known as the Village Development Committee) at Kulekhani. 
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This amounts to 0.144% of the value of power produced, which for Kulekhani 
is about US$50,000 per year.
3.. Participatory approach and data analysis
To explore the second proposition, we conducted focus group discussions with 
communities at each site on how they perceive poverty, constraints in implementing 
RES, and preferred types of RES. To ensure consistency in the process and the 
outputs of focus group discussions at various locations, we conducted a cross-site 
training workshop and developed a set of working procedures and agreements 
on research steps to be undertaken at all sites. The results from each focus group 
discussion were collated into coherent categories to identify patterns and analyse 
their responses.
Participants in these discussions were members of communities where RUPES 
project activities had been implemented. Most participants were already familiar 
with RES principles. One limitation of this method is that local perspectives could 
be biased towards on-going interventions because RUPES and other stakeholders 
were making progress towards RES. Table 2 shows the number of targeted 
respondents from each site.
Table	2:	Sample	respondents	representing	the	households	of	environmental	service	providers	
at	each	site.
Sites Targeted respondents Number of 
respondents
Percentage of 
households
Indonesia
Bathin III Ulu, Bungo Five groups in sub-villages at jungle 
rubber locations 
90 28
Paninggahan, Singkarak Eight groups in two Nagari or village 
levels
80 43
Sumberjaya Three community groups: 
1)  two community forestry groups;
2)  one River Care group;
3)  one land conservation group
103 27
The Philippines  
Bakun Three main clusters based on elevation: 
1) lower (1 barangay or village);
2) middle (4 barangays); and
3) upper (2 barangays)
124 39
Kalahan Ancestral  
Domain 
Two community groups based on 
elevation:
1) high elevation – (3 barangays); and 
2) low elevation – (4 barangays)
40 27
Nepal  
Kulekhani Seven village development committees  
or VDCs
97 78
Total 534 36
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All case study analyses employed a multidimensional perspective of poverty, 
drawing to some extent on the Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA) originally 
developed by Chambers and Conway (1992). SLA is a unified concept of well-
being that encompasses both economic and non-economic aspects, and it has been 
used both for project design and for evaluation of impacts (Ashley and Hussein 
2000). Assumed advantages of SLA are that it is people-centred and participatory, 
and that it recognizes the importance of ‘assets’ that the poor do not own. It is also 
informative about causal processes that reduce or increase poverty (Mukherjee 
et al. 2002; Grieg-Gran et al. 2005). Critics have pointed out that effects of different 
assets are overlapping (Angelsen and Wunder 2003; Grieg-Gran et al. 2005). 
Despite such valid critiques, SLA can at least provide a useful checklist of possible 
livelihood impacts related to introduction of environmental service rewards. 
4. Results
.1. Payment for environmental service value as fraction of upstream income
The model of PES value as a fraction of income suggests that downstream to 
upstream ratios of population density, income per capita, and coverage area 
can provide rough estimates of minimum financial transfers to ES providers. 
For example, if there is an ability of the downstream population to pay about 1 
percent of their income in order to generate an increment from RES equivalent 
to 5 percent6 of income in the upstream population, the ratio of downstream 
population density to upstream density must be at least five. In other words, the 
number of ES buyers must be at least five times greater than the number of ES 
providers. 
Spatial analyses of agroecosystems in Indonesia conducted by the World 
Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) estimated the ratios of downstream to upstream 
population density and the ratios of downstream to upstream areas covered by 
agroecosystems (Table 3). The ICRAF team identified the ratio of downstream/ 
upstream agroecosystem areas by their relative positions in a digital elevation 
model (DEM). Their analysis also found that the downstream to upstream ratio 
of population density in Java/Bali was 2.2 (Table 4). Java/Bali agroecosystems 
represent a typology that has potential problems related to watershed functions. 
The ES beneficiaries are rice-field farmers or urban citizens, while their upstream 
neighbours practice intensive mixed cropping. Watershed problems in these 
settings are mostly reduced water quality caused by heavy use of agricultural 
chemicals and fertilizers; and/or insufficient water quantity due to competing 
domestic and agricultural uses. Another important typology is found in islands 
outside Java and Bali, where downstream farmers cultivate tree crops or intensive 
mixed crops areas and forests are located upstream. The potential ES problem 
6
 We select the 5 percent as the minimal threshold for an appreciable financial incentive share to income. 
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in such areas is forest biodiversity loss due to crop expansion. The ratio of 
downstream to upstream area ranges from 0.06 (rice/urban downstream and forest 
upstream) to 0.79 (mixed tree crop downstream and forest upstream). In other 
words, upstream areas are more extensive in comparison to downstream areas in 
almost all parts of Indonesia. 
Since urban poverty is a major problem in Indonesia, ratios of downstream 
income to upstream income also tend to be low. The average range of the ratio 
Table	3:	Downstream/upstream	ratios	of	population	density	and	areas	covered	by	agroecosystem	
combinations	found	in	Indonesia	(adapted	from	Hadi	and	van	Noordwijk	2005).
Population Density 
Pd Pu
–1
Area 
Ad Au–1
Factor (Population 
Density × Area)
Lowland: rice/urban;  
Upland: intensive mixed
1.6 0.36 0.58
Lowland: rice/urban;  
Upland: forest
11 0.06 0.66
Lowland: intensive mixed;  
Upland: forest
6 0.26 1.56
Lowland: tree crop mixed;  
Upland: intensive mixed plantation
0.6 0.56 0.34
Lowland: tree crop mixed;  
Upland: forest
3.6 0.79 2.84
Table	 4:	 Ratio	 of	 downstream/upstream	 population	 density	 in	 agroecosystem	 combinations	
that	occur	in	various	areas	of	Indonesia	(adapted	from	Hadi	and	van	Noordwijk	2005).
Population density ratio 
(downstream/upstream)
Jawa/Bali Sumatra Sulawesi Kalimantan NTT/ NTB/ 
Maluku
Papua
Downstream: rice/urban;  
Upstream: intensive  
mixed crops
2.2 0.6 1.8 – – –
Downstream: rice/urban;  
Upstream: forest
– 6.4 – – 20.0 6.8
Downstream: intensive 
mixed;  
Upstream: forest
– 3.7 6.3 5.8 8.0
Downstream: tree crop 
mixed;  
Upstream: intensive mixed 
plantation
– 0.7 0.6 – –
Downstream: tree crop 
mixed; 
Upstream: forest
– 2.5 4.6 – –
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between urban and rural income in 20037 was about 1.3 for cities with moderate 
level of income, such as ones outside Java, to 2.0 for cities with high income 
level, and this proportion has been stable since 1996. Transaction costs of 
community-based resource management in Nepal were found to range from 14 to 
26% (Adhikari and Lovett 2006). This range of values appears reasonable and is 
supported by research on transaction costs of small scale carbon projects where 
they were found to range from 13 to 30% of total project cost (EcoSecurities and 
Development 2003; Cacho et al. 2005).
Using the data above, we undertook a modelling exercise to illustrate 
use of information on downstream–upstream population density, area, and 
welfare in assessing the feasibility of an ES reward scheme based on cash 
payments. First, we generalize the above information as defaults for Asian 
conditions. We then multiply each factor to make the estimated ES payment 
more realistic. We consider a payment ‘realistic’ if the value to income fraction 
is more than 0.05, or the payment is more than 5 percent of disposable income. 
Second, we show how ES payments as income fractions vary among different 
scenarios.
Our analysis suggests that if we consider current Asian upstream–
downstream situations as defaults, several conditions need to be satisfied 
to achieve target payment levels as follows (Table 5): (1) the downstream 
coverage area should be at least 3.6 times larger than the upstream coverage 
area; (2) downstream buyers should have income at least 7.1 times higher 
than the upstream sellers; (3) the number of downstream buyers should be 
7.1 times larger than the number of upstream sellers; (4) buyers should be 
willing and able to pay at least 4 percent of their income as a contribution to 
ES provision from upstream.
In other words, a cash payment scheme that seeks to contribute substantially 
to poverty alleviation will require certain conditions: targeted ES buyers occupy 
a relatively large area with high population density, such as big cities, and high 
willingness and ability to pay relative to their income (Table 6). The analysis 
did not include the forgone income of ES providers joining a RES scheme or 
7
 Formal data from BAPPENAS – the Indonesian National Planning Agency downloaded from 
www.tempointeractive.com
Table	5:	Multiplying	factors	for	targeting	payment	of	5	percent	of	upstream	income.
Scenario Ad.Au–1 Id.Iu–1 Pd.	Pu–1 βd. T αu TPu
Default 1 2 2 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0140
Downstream/upstream area ratio 3.57
Downstream/upstream income ratio 7.14
Downstream/upstream population density ratio 7.14
Downstream willingness and ability to pay 0.04
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the transaction costs involved. Transaction costs in developing a RES scheme 
involve costs of stakeholder participation, negotiation processes and institution 
building, which usually are expensive (Perrot-Maître and Davis 2001). These 
costs may increase further if other aspects of implementation are included, such 
as monitoring and enforcement, conflict management, and making necessary 
changes in legal and regulatory frameworks. Inclusion of opportunity costs and 
transaction costs will indeed reduce the net share of RES payments that increase 
upstream incomes. 
.2. Local perspectives on poverty
This section examines local people’s opinions on factors that contribute to poverty. 
Poverty factors are classified into the five types of capital used in the Sustainable 
Livelihoods Approach (SLA), as shown in Table 7. 
While results show substantial variation among communities at different sites, 
some general similarities exist. In the case of human capital, for example, lack 
of knowledge and access to higher education are the most important aspects that 
people at sites in all types of landscapes perceived as poverty related. Lack of 
human capital mainly limits opportunities for better jobs. Site-level discussions 
revealed that access to health services is also an important problem at most study 
sites, and especially in Kulekhani, Sumberjaya, and Bungo. With the exceptions 
of Singkarak and Sumberjaya, access to education is limited to elementary level, 
and drop-out levels are high. The condition is worse in Kulekhani where surveys 
indicate not more than 50% adult literacy rates.
Compared to other sites, perceived need for physical/financial capital is the 
highest in Kalahan, where all land is either remote core forest or conservation forest. 
Communities in Kalahan use poorly maintained roads that are often inaccessible 
during the rainy season. The nearest market for upstream communities in Kalahan 
is about 11 to 24 km, depending on road condition, whereas distance to market at 
other sites varies from 1 to 5 km.
Table	6:	Outcomes	from	different	scenarios	on	area,	population	density	and	welfare.	
Scenario Ad.Au–1 Id.Iu–1 Pd.	Pu–1 βd. T αu TPu
Default 1 2 2 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0140
ES providers occupied large area 0.2 2 2 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0028
ES buyers occupied large area  2 2 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0560*
Poor downstream buyers 1 0.5 2 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0035
Rich downstream buyers 1 5 2 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0350
Highly populated upstream area 1 2 0.75 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0053
Highly populated downstream area 1 2 10 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0700*
Low willingness and ability to pay of buyers 1 2 2 0.003 0.3 0.5 0.0042
High willingness and ability to pay of buyers 1 2 2 0.05 0.3 0.5 0.0700*
Note: *indicating that such scenarios have potential for downstream–upstream ES transactions.
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Table	7:	Local	perspectives	on	factors	contributing	to	poverty.	
Capital/Site Bungo Singkarak Sumberjaya Bakun Kalahan Kulekhani
Financial Low income
Lack of 
financial 
investment
Low income Low income Low income
Lack of 
financial 
investment 
Low income
No financial 
planning
No savings
Low prices of 
farm products
Low income
Physical Poor road 
infrastructure 
Not 
mentioned 
Poor living 
condition 
Poor living 
condition 
Poor access  
to road 
Lack of farm 
irrigation and 
farm inputs 
(fertilizer, 
good quality 
seed) 
Small number 
of livestock 
Poor access  
to road
Poor living 
condition 
Poor road 
infrastructure
No access to 
market
Human Lack of 
knowledge
Laziness 
Lack of future 
planning
Lack of 
creativity 
Poor health 
services
Low 
education 
level
Low 
education 
level
Poor nutrition 
status
No access to 
job market
Poor access 
to children 
education 
Poor health 
services
Low 
education 
level
Laziness 
Unmotivated 
and bad 
working 
attitude 
Low 
education 
level 
Laziness 
Low 
education 
level 
No access to 
job market
Poor health 
services
Insecure food 
supply
Large family 
size 
Natural Small land  
size
Disturbance 
of pests 
and disease 
to rubber 
plantation
Not  
mentioned
No access to 
good quality  
of land 
Small land  
size
Small land  
size
Small land 
size
Social Not  
mentioned 
Insecure land 
ownership
Low social 
participation 
Not  
mentioned 
Not  
mentioned
Not  
mentioned
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Although people at case study sites in all types of landscapes have low income8, 
they rated financial capital as being only moderately associated with poverty. 
Discussions revealed that people have access to credit from various sources, which 
can include both formal sources (bank credit, local cooperatives, microcredit) 
and informal sources (relatives, friends, middle-men). Trends toward increasing 
levels of consumptive credit with high interest rates are associated with changing 
lifestyles in rural areas that include increased levels of consumption.
These findings capture fairly well existing poverty conditions at each site, and 
also disclose major livelihood concerns of communities including social aspects. 
At all sites except Sumberjaya, small size of landholdings (natural/financial capital) 
was seen as an attribute of poverty, whereas social capital was not mentioned. In 
the case of Sumberjaya, communities have a higher social diversity that includes 
three major ethnic groups: Semendo (native Lampung), Javanese (from Central 
and East Java) and Sundanese (from West Java). Sumberjaya was a target area for 
migration from Java and widespread evictions were experienced in the past, which 
has resulted in high levels of legally insecure land tenure. This also happened in 
Kalahan in the past, where the indigenous people, the Ikalahan, struggled for the 
legal control of their ancestral domain claims. Interestingly, no site other than 
Bungo mentioned lack of other types of natural capital, and in Bungo this was in 
connection to investments for controlling pest and diseases in the field.
.3. Perceived constraints on rewards for environmental services
Locally perceived constraints on implementing RES schemes are summarized 
according to the four stages of RES development (Table 8):
(a)	 Scoping	by	identifying	valuable	ES	and	measures	to	increase	them. A constraint 
expressed in Bakun was lack of information about types of land management 
practices to maintain watershed functions. In Singkarak, people mentioned 
limited land ownership that might limit ability to contribute to ES provision.
(b)	Stakeholder	analysis	of	RES	key	actors. Bungo communities had difficulty in 
identifying buyers, and even the notion of global buyers for biodiversity seemed 
very abstract for them. For Kalahan and Sumberjaya, internal constraints 
among community members were mostly related to needs for strengthening 
their local institutions before dealing with buyers, and for improving balance 
with regard to local equity (such as rights for being consulted and making 
collective decision) and transparency of information (such as contract contents, 
type of rewards gained).
8
 Secondary data from 2000–2005 show that income per capita in these areas is less than US$2 per 
day (Philippines National Statistics Office, 2000; Bakun Municipal Baseline Survey 2005; Bungo 
District website www.bungokab.go.id; The Nepali Makawanpur DDC 2003; Sumberjaya in Numbers 
2003; Tanah Datar in Numbers 2002).
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(c)  Negotiation	between	ES	 sellers	and	buyers.	People at sites in all types of 
landscapes easily recognized this stage and identified it as a serious constraint. 
They are also concerned about the cumbersome nature of negotiation 
processes (due to power imbalance between the sellers and buyers, or even 
between sellers and government or intermediaries: “rewards never flow back 
to community”). The long gap between project planning and its realization 
is also problematic. A further concern is that buyers might not have enough 
funds for equitable RES.
(d)  Implementation	and	monitoring	of	contractual	agreements.	At this stage, 
people focused on the difficulties in monitoring ES. Bungo communities 
mentioned concern about procedures for monitoring biodiversity. They 
are worried about contractual obligations resulting from the negotiation 
stage and how well local people will adhere to agreed practices. The 
sustainability of RES implementation was one of the concerns of people 
in Kalahan. 
Table	8:	Local	perspective	of	constraints	at	each	RES	development	stage.
Stages/Site Bungo Singkarak Sumberjaya Bakun Kalahan Kulekhani
Scoping Not 
mentioned
Limited 
land size to 
provide ES
Not 
mentioned
Lack of 
information 
about types 
of land 
management 
practices
Not 
mentioned
Not 
mentioned
Stakeholder 
analysis 
Difficult 
to identify 
(international) 
buyers
Not 
mentioned
Weak local 
institutions 
Not 
mentioned
Individual 
rights/local 
equity
Ensuring 
transparency 
of decision
Not 
mentioned
Negotiation Lengthy and 
cumbersome 
Lengthy and 
cumbersome 
Unbalanced 
power of 
negotiation, 
low 
capability 
of sellers to 
negotiate 
Conflict 
existing with 
potential 
buyers
Time 
consuming
Limited 
funding 
from buyers
Unsure that 
rewards 
will flow 
back to the 
community
Asymmetric 
information 
available 
between 
sellers and 
buyers
Unclear 
negotiation 
rules 
Potential 
risk that 
the poor’s 
concerns 
neglected
Lengthy and 
cumbersome 
Monitoring and 
implementation 
Difficult to 
monitor ES
Not 
mentioned
Not 
mentioned
Not 
mentioned
Payment not 
sustainable
Not 
mentioned
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Table	9:	Expected	environmental	service	rewards	by	locals.
Capital/Site Bungo Singkarak Sumberjaya Bakun Kalahan Kulekhani
Financial Not 
mentioned
Not mentioned Cash Not 
mentioned
Financial 
assistance 
Not 
mentioned
Non-direct 
financial 
Cooperative 
for credit 
access
Reduction in 
electricity bill
Access to soft 
loans
Forming 
of a farmer 
cooperative
Reduction 
in electricity 
bill
Access to 
soft loan
Reduction in 
electricity bill
Physical Micro-
hydropower
Supply 
of rubber 
seedlings
Road 
infrastructure
Integrated pest 
management 
tools 
Farming  
tools 
Road 
infrastructure 
Road 
infrastructure
Road 
infrastructure
Road 
infrastructure
Access to 
market
Road 
infrastructure
Access to 
market 
Human Training and 
cross-site visit
Trainings for 
alternative 
small business
Agricultural 
extension 
Information 
on 
agricultural 
technology
Access to 
labour market 
Health 
services
Access to 
labour market 
Educational 
services
Trainings for 
alternative 
small 
business
Public 
services 
Trainings for 
alternative 
small 
business, such 
as ecotourism 
management 
and non-
timber forest 
product 
Natural Not 
mentioned
Not  
mentioned
Not 
mentioned
Not 
mentioned
Not 
mentioned
Not 
mentioned
Social Recognition 
as 
environmental 
champion
Recognition as 
environmental 
champion 
Community 
forest permit
Security of 
land tenure
Trust from 
government 
(to maintain 
good 
environment) 
Recognition 
as 
environmental 
champion
.. People’s preferences on rewards
In order to facilitate comparison with findings in Section 4.2 on factors contributing 
to poverty, we analysed preferred forms of rewards identified by communities by 
classifying them under the five types of SLA capital (Table 9). Two communities, 
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in Sumberjaya and Kalahan, clearly requested reward money. Communities in 
all case study sites demanded various forms of indirect cash assistance (such as 
access to productive credit and reduction in electricity bills), productive physical 
inputs or assets (such as seedlings, farming tools, roads, access to market), and 
improvements in human capital (such as health and education services, training 
for alternative livelihoods and small business). People in Sumberjaya and Bakun 
demanded social capital in the form of community forestry permits and secure 
land tenure. These preferences might have been driven by their history of violence 
due to insecure land tenure. People in all other sites (Singkarak, Bungo, Kulekhani 
and Kalahan) solicited recognition of and trust in their environmentally-benign 
land management activities.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Increased global commitments to poverty alleviation and conservation9 are 
inducing scientists and policy makers to focus on balancing trade-offs between 
poverty and conservation. This paper combined theory and case study evidence 
of RES in an attempt to analyse the contribution of actual cash for individual 
ES providers to poverty alleviation, and to observe other non-financial benefits 
gained by communities engaging in such schemes.
Our model of the income share of RES payment value demonstrates that RES 
can only have a significant effect on rural income in upstream areas that provide 
ES if the scheme (1) involves upstream providers who have low population density 
and/or a small area relative to the beneficiaries and downstream beneficiaries who 
have relatively higher income than the upstream providers; (2) provides highly 
critical and non-substitutable environmental services that are substantial and worth 
paying; (3) is efficient and has low opportunity and transaction costs, but high 
willingness and ability to pay of downstream beneficiaries. Analysis of income 
and spatial data on agroecosystems in Indonesia indicates that this condition may 
be difficult to achieve given the population and income structures of downstream 
and upstream areas in Asia. Although the Asian data shows upstream income levels 
tend to be lower than those in downstream/urban areas (IFAD 2002), the ratio 
between urban and rural income is still quite low (<2.0). Indeed, in East Africa 
where the highlands provide more profitable agricultural products, we noted that 
upstream income can even be somewhat higher than downstream/urban income 
(Brent Swallow pers. comm). Despite current limitations on data, we recommend 
this simple model as a useful tool for initial diagnosis to determine the feasibility 
of implementing a RES/PES scheme. Accurate diagnosis during very early stages 
9
 Examples of global commitments are the general acceptance of the Millennium Development 
Goals and Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and associated international agreements, such as 
Convention on Biological Diversity.
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can help avoid useless investment and over expectations about the role of RES in 
alleviating poverty.
The RES initiatives in Asia analysed in this study were quite heterogeneous 
in their types of poverty, landscape characteristics and environmental services 
provided. They also differed in their socio-cultural backgrounds, and in their 
modes for involvement of local communities. This reinforces the view that each 
site needs a localized design for pro-poor RES that takes into account their specific 
local perspectives, as well as the dominant types of landscapes and the particular 
environmental services that are most important within the local context.
Assessment of people’s perspectives on factors contributing to their poverty 
in the context of developing a RES payment approach highlights many interesting 
insights. Results can help portray social, economic and institutional dimensions 
of current situations that need to be recognized in designing pro-poor RES 
approaches that are suitable for local conditions. One particularly important aspect 
of pro-poor RES design is to identify rewards that match with people’s needs 
and expectations. From our analysis, we conclude that rewards in the forms of 
human capital, social capital and physical capital – or what are often referred to as 
non-financial incentives – are very often the most preferred and possible types of 
rewards. This supports our second proposition on how non-financial incentives can 
make important marginal contributions to local livelihoods, which was especially 
clear in the case of conditional land tenure in Sumberjaya. Moreover, literature 
on collective action in natural resource management indicates that social capital 
of community members influences the magnitude of transaction costs. Higher 
levels of social cohesion and trust within the community and its external linkages 
are associated with lower transaction costs. This suggests that investments that 
provide non-financial benefits to communities, such as strengthening social 
capital, can help reduce overall costs of RES implementation.
Among the various stages of RES development, constraints faced by 
communities at the stages of ‘stakeholder analysis’ and especially ‘negotiation’ 
seem to be the most important initial hurdles for communities in all types of 
landscapes. Although not all communities at RUPES action sites have reached 
the ‘implementation and monitoring’ stage, communities at sites dominated by 
remote core forest and conservation forest seem to be particularly concerned 
about monitoring of services like biodiversity and carbon sequestration. Overall, 
it appears that the criteria ‘voluntary’ and ‘conditional’ for establishing rewards 
for ES are the most important issue for local communities. Under our theoretical 
framework, ‘voluntary’ refers to involvement based on free choice by each 
community rather than their being the object of regulation. This relates to all 
levels of decision making – internally within communities, and externally in their 
relationships with ES intermediaries and buyers. Furthermore, a conditional RES 
must ensure transparency regarding conditions when rewards can be granted or 
not. In designing a RES, solving problems at local levels related to voluntary 
participation and conditionality can help make the whole process more effective. 
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Beyond that, the roles of intermediaries and buyers are also very important in 
ensuring that the RES is realistic and pro-poor.
We limited our study to action research sites that were selected from a larger 
set of candidates on the basis of expectations that all essential requirements for 
RES could be met. Thus, these sites may not necessarily represent the broader 
conditions of all upstream areas of Asia. However, this study’s results can 
contribute to on-going debates related to the interface of fairness and efficiency in 
providing rewards for environmental services in Asia.
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